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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondant, 
Case No. 
Vs. 
12412 
REGGIE McGEE 
Defendant and Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Reggie McGee appeals from 
his conviction of Subornation of Perjury 
in the First Degree. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged with Subor-
~tion of Perjury in the First Degree on 
llie 6th day of February, 1970. At the 
heliminary Hearing, Judge Ziegler dis-
( 1) 
missed the action because there was no 
corroboration as to the fact of perjury 
having been conunitted. The action was 
refiled on September 18, 1970,and the 
appellant was bound over to the District 
Court to stand trial. The appellant was 
subsequently convicted of Subornation of 
Perjury in the First Degree and sentenced 
to the Utah State Prison for a term of 
not less than one (1), nor more than 
five (5) years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant respectfully requests 
this Honorable Court to reverse the judg-
ment of the lower court and order that 
the matter be dismissed. In the alter-
native, the appellant requests that he be 
granted a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 6, 1970, the appellant 
(2) 
was charged with "Subornation of Perjury 
in the First Degree." A Preliminary 
Hearing was held before the Honorable 
E. Fred Ziegler, and at the conclusion 
of the State's case Judge Ziegler dis-
missed the matter on the grounds that 
the State failed to prove one of the ele-
ments of the offense. He ruled that to 
prove Subornation of Perjury the State 
must show: (1) that perjury had been 
committed, and (2) that the appellant 
procured or induced Eldrege Williams to 
commit that perjury. He further ruled 
that even though a single witness is suf-
ficient to prove the element of subor-
nation, it is necessary to have corro-
boration of an admitted perjurer to prove 
the element of perjury. The State did 
not corroborate its single witness on the 
question of perjury. 
The appellant was recharged on Sept-
(3) 
teIUber 18, 1970 with the same offense, and 
preliminary hearing was held on October 
15, 1970. At the preliminary hearing, 
the only testimony given by Eldredge 
Williams concerning the question of sub-
orna ti on was 
"That McGee 'found him,' 
that he doesn't recall the 
conversation but that as a 
result of conversation McGee 
had knowledge as to what he 
the witness would testify to 
at the trial." (Tr.4) 
On the basis of the above testimony 
the defendant was bound over to stand 
trial. 
At trial, the only evidence the 
State had as to perjury or subornation 
came from the lips of Eldredge Williams, 
a self-confessed perjurer. Mr. Williams 
testified that he had lied during trial 
wherein Mr. McGee was charged with Grand 
Larceny. (Tr. 123). When Williams was 
asked about his conversation with McGee 
and his reasons for lying we note the 
(4) 
following dialogue: 
Q. "And what, if anything, 
were you asked to do in 
connection with the tri-
al?" 
A. "Well, really I wasn't 
asked to do nothing, 
really, but I did it." 
(Tr. 125) . 
Q. "He didn't pay you any-
thing did he?" 
A. "No." (Tr. 135). 
Q. "Did he threaten you?" 
A. "(Shakes head.)" (Tr. 135). 
Q. "Did he say he was going 
to harm you in any way if 
you didn't help him?" 
A. "No." (Tr.135). 
Q. "Well, then was it your 
own idea to do this sort 
of thing?" 
A. "In a way, yeah." (Tr. 135). 
Q. "He didn't ask you then to 
do it?" 
A. "No. " (Tr . 14 7) . 
Q. "Now, would you have made 
the statement you made in 
the District Court on the 
grand larceny charge if 
Mr. McGee had not suggested 
or talked to you about the 
testimony?" 
A. "Yeah." 
Q. "You would have done it 
anyway?" 
A. "(Nods head.)" 
Q. "And you would have done 
( 5) 
it even though you had not 
talked to Mr. McGee under 
any circumstances about this?" 
A. "Yeah." 
Q. Whose idea was it that you 
should testify in Court?" 
A. "I can't remember. Wait a 
minute, whose idea was it 
or what --" 
Q. "That you should testify in 
Court that you took the gun." 
A. "It was my idea, mine, that 
I would say I did it." 
Q. "Okay, now when did you have 
this idea, before or after 
you talked to Mr. McGee?" 
A. "I had it, well before and 
after. I was thinking, and 
then I started, like I said 
--well, I was. I said to 
myself, I will go ahead and 
do that." 
A. (sic) "Now, had anyone else 
suggested to you that you 
should do that?" 
A. "No." 
Q. "Did you talk to anybody 
other than Mr. McGee con-
cerning your testifying in 
Court that you had taken the 
gun?" 
A. "Not that I remember." 
(Tr. 151-152) . 
POINT I 
PERJURY IS AN ELEMENT OF SUBORNATION OF 
PERJURY AND THE PERSON WHO CLAIMS HE 
COMMITTED PERJURY MUST BE CORROBORATED 
AS TO THE ELEMENT OF PERJURY 
(6) 
One of the essential elements of the 
crime of "Subornation of Perjury" is to 
prove that the person suborned did in 
fact commit perjury. This principle has 
been set forth by the Supreme Court of 
Utah as follows: 
"In the crime of subornation 
of perjury, two essential el-
ements are present: (1) The 
commission of perjury by the 
person alleged to have been 
suborned, and (2) a willful 
procuring or inducing such 
person to commit perjury by 
the alleged suborner, he 
knowing of its falsity." 
State Vs. Gleason, 86 Utah 
26, 40 p.2d. 222, at 225. (1935) 
At the appellant's trial the Court 
instructed the jury that they must find 
"That perjury was committed by Eldredge 
Williams," (Instruction No. 9, Tr. 47) . 
But the Court refused to instruct the 
jury that Mr. Williams' testimony as to 
committing perjury must be corroborated. 
To this the appellant excepted (Tr. 170-
171). The Trial Court construed State Vs. 
Gleason, supra, as follows: 
(7) 
"THE COURT: I place a differ-
ent interpretation on State 
v. Gleason than Defense Coun-
sel does, and I interperet it 
as holding a conviction for 
subornation of perjury may be 
had upon the testimony of a 
single witness." (T. 171). 
Appellant conceeds that under Utah 
Law it is not necessary to corroborate 
the allegedly suborned as to the ele-
ment of subornation but we argue here 
that as to the element of perjury he is 
an accomplice and must be corroborated. 
In State Vs. Gleason, supra, there 
was an abundance of evidence as to the 
question of perjury with the Court stat-
ing at page 225 "As already seen, the 
fact the.perjury was committed is abund-
antly proved." In fact the defendant 
Gleason stipulated that the testimony of 
Grace Royce was untrue. State v. Gleason, 
supra, at 223. Appellant here argues 
that the State must corroborate the testi-
mony of Williams as to the element of per-
( 8) 
jury and that the trial court must in-
struct the jury as to corroboration of 
an accomplice. In support of our argu-
ment we cite the following material from 
State v. Gleason,supra, at 226: 
"[5) The doctrine announced 
by nearly all state and federal 
courts, where decisions have 
been rendered, is, in cases of 
subornation, that the suborned 
and the suborner are accomplices 
as to the perjury, and as to 
that two witnesses are required, 
or one witness and corroborating 
circumstances, but as to other 
elements of the crime such as 
inducing or procuring the perjury 
to be committed they are not 
accomplices, and testimony as to 
such matters by a person alleged 
to have been suborned need not 
be corroborated to sustain a con-
viction. 21 R.C.L. 276. See 
note 56 A.L.R. 412. 
Probably the leading case on 
the subject is that of State v. 
Renswick, 85 Minn. 19, 88 N.W. 
22, wherein it was said: 'The 
completed crime of subornation 
of perjury consists of two essen-
tial elements, -- the commission 
of perjury by the person suborned, 
and the willfully procuring or 
inducing him to do so by the 
suborner. Gen. St. 1894, 6379. 
As to the first element of the 
crime, the suborned and the sub-
( 9) 
orner are principals by vir-
tue of the statute (Id § 
6310), and necessarily each 
is the accomplice of the other; 
hence this element of the 
crime cannot be established by 
the uncorroborated evidence of 
the suborned (Id. § 5767). 
But as to the second element 
of the crime, the suborned is 
neither a principal nor an 
accomplice, for legally he 
cannot be quilty of persuading 
himself to commit perjury. 
An indictment of a party for 
inducing himself to commit a 
crime would be a legal absur-
dity. State v. Pearce,56 Minn. 
231, 57 N. W. 652, 1065; 
State V. Durnam, 73 Minn. 150, 
75 N. W. 1127. The conlusion 
logically follows that if, in 
the prosecution of a party for 
subornation of perjury, it is 
sought to establish the fact 
that perjury was committed by 
the testimony of the person 
committing it, his testimony 
must be corroborated as to 
such fact, because as to the 
perjury he is an accomplice. 
But the alleged fact that he 
was induced to commit the 
crime by the accused may be 
established by his uncorro-
borated testimony if it satis-
fied the jury beyond a reason-
able doubt.' 
The rule thus announced is 
approved in both State and Fed-
eral courts. Cohen v. 
(10) 
United States, supra; Common-
wealth v. Douglass, 5 Mete. 
Mass. 24; Stone v. State, 
118 Ga. 705, 45 S.E. 630, 98 
Am. St. Rep. 145; Bell v. 
State, 5 Ga. App. 701, 63 
S.E. 860; State v. Wilhelm, 
114 Kan. 349, 219 p. 510; 
State v. Ruskin, 117 Ohio St. 
426, 159 N. E. 568, 56 A. L. R. 
403; State v. Smith, 153 Minn. 
167, 190 N. W. 48; Bradley v. 
Commonwealth, 245 Ky. 101, 
53 S.W. (2d) 215. In at least 
two jurisdictions the above 
rules have been followed where 
they have statutes similar to 
R. S. Utah 1933, 105-21-24, 
defining who are principals, 
where by statute accomplices 
are required to be corroborated 
as provided in R. S. Utah 1933, 
105-32-18. State v. Renswick, 
Minn. and State v. Stone (Ga.), 
supra. In some jurisdictions 
it is held the suborner and 
suborned are not accomplices 
at all, and in a prosecution 
for subornation of perjury the 
evidence of one witness, if 
believed, is sufficient. 
Strader v. Commonwealth, 240 Ky. 
5 5 9 ' 4 2 s . w. ( 2d) 7 3 6 ; 
Conn v. Commonwealth, 234 Ky. 
153, 27 s.w. (2d) 736; 
State v. Richardson, 248 Mo. 
563, 154 S.W. 735, 44 L. R. A. 
(N.S.) 307; State v. White, 
Mo. Sup. 263 s.w. 192; 
State v. Pratt, 21 S.D. 305, 
112 N. W. 152; United States v. 
Thompson (C.C.) 31 F. 331; 
( 11} 
Boren v. United States (C.C.A.) 
144 F. 801. 
New York cases in the lower 
courts hold that a suborner 
and suborned are joint prin-
cipals, and therefore accom-
plices requiring corroboration 
under statutes similar to ours. 
People V. Markan, 123 Misc. 689, 
206 N.Y. S. 340; and see, also, 
State v. Fahey, 3 Pennewill 
(Del.) 594, 54 A. 690. This 
however, is contrary to the 
decision of this court in State 
v. Justesen, 35 Utah 105; 99 Pac. 
456, wherein it was held (cit-
ing headnote) that: ~Perjury 
and subornation of perjury are 
separate and distinct offenses, 
and one charged with subor-
nation of perjury is not an 
accessory of the one committing 
the perjury. ' 
We are inclined therefore 
to follow the cases which hold 
that as to the subornation 
charged the evidence of one wit-
ness is sufficient to support 
a verdict where the jury be-
lieved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the witness has told the 
truth. The jury, of course, 
are the sole judges of the weight 
of the testimony and credibility 
of the witnesses." (Emphasis added) 
As indicated above the vast majority of 
the State and Federal courts agree with 
~e position argued by the appellant, and 
( 12) 
that only a small minority of the juris-
dictions hold that the testimony of the 
alleged suborned alone is sufficient to 
prove both perjury and subornation of 
perjury. Judge Gould seems to have based 
his opinion of the Utah positon in State 
v. Gleason, on the distinction made be-
tween the New York cases quoted above 
and State v. Justesen, 35 Utah 105, 99 
Pac. 456. However, the New York cases 
take the positon that the suborner and the 
suborned are joint principals and require 
corroboration even as to subornation. 
Appellant agrees that under Utah law, 
it is not necessary to corroborate the 
subornation, but we feel that from the 
language of State v. Gleason, this court 
intended to follow the decisions of the 
vast majority of the other jurisdictions. 
We further rely upon the case of 
Hammer v. United states, 271 U. S. 620, 
(13) 
70 Led 1118 (1926) , Wherein the court 
said, at Page 628: 
"As petitioner cannot be 
guilty of subornation unless 
Trinz committed perjury before 
the referee, the evidence 
must be sufficient to establish 
beyond reasonable doubt the 
falsity of his oath alleged as 
perjury. The question is not 
whether the uncorroborated test-
mony of Trinz is enough to sus-
tain a finding that his oath 
before the referee was false. 
Clearly the case is not as strong 
for the prosecution as where a 
witness, presumed to be honest 
and by the government vouched 
for as worthy of belief, is 
called to testify to the falsity 
of the oath of defendant set 
forth as perjury in the indict-
ment. Here the sole reliance of 
the government is the unsup-
ported testimony of the one for 
whose character it cannot vouch--
a dishonest man guilty of perjury 
on one occasion or the other. 
There is no reason why the testi-
mony of such a one should be per-
mitted to have greater weight 
than that of a witness not so 
discredited. People v. Evans, 
40 N. Y. 1, 3." 
The court further stated at 
page 626: 
"The general rule in prose-
cutions for perjury is that the 
uncorroborated oath of one witness 
(14) 
is not enough to establish the 
falsity of the testimony of 
the accused set forth in the 
indictment as perjury. The 
applicaiton of that rule in 
Federal and State courts is 
well nigh universal." 
In the note referred to in the above 
paragraph, the court cited a multitude of 
cases supporting their position. 70 L. 
Ed. 1118 at 1120. 
Since there was no corroboration as 
to the element of perjury, the District 
Court erred in not granting appellant's 
Motion to Dismiss at the end of the 
State's case, and further erred in not 
instructing the jury that Williams' 
testimony must be corroborated as to the 
element of perjury. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
AT TRIAL THAT THE APPELLANT ACT-
UALLY SUBORNED MR. WILLIAMS. 
At appellant's trial for Subornation 
of Perjury, Mr. Williams, the person who 
the State alleged was suborned, did not 
testify that he was suborned. Look-
( 15) 
ing at the case most favorably to the 
State, the most that can be said is that 
if Mr. Williams committed perjury, the 
appellant may have known of Mr. Williams' 
intentions prior to the trial. We 
refer the Court to the dialogue included 
in the statement of facts. 
The appellant was charged under 
Title 76-45-9 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
which states: 
"A person who willfully pro-
cures or induces another~ 
commit perjury in the First 
Degree, is guilty of Subor-
nation of Perjury in the 
First Degree." (Emphasis added) 
The testimony of Eldredge Williams 
was that any perjury he may have commit-
ted was his 0wn idea. Mr. Williams fur-
ther stated that the appellant did not 
ask him to do it nor did he threaten 
him in any way. There is no evidence 
that the appellant procured or induced 
Mr. Williams to commit perjury. 
{16) 
With respect to definitions of the 
terms "INDUCE" and "PROCURE" we note 
the following: 
INDUCE. To bring on or about, 
to affect; cause, to influ-
ence to an act or course of 
conduct, lead by persuasion 
or reasoning, incite by mot-
ives, prevail on. State v. 
Stratford, 55 Idaho 65, 37 
p. 2d 681, 68 2. 
Blacks Law Dictionary, Deluxe 
Fourth Edition, West Publishing 
Company. Page 915 
With respect to the term "Procure" 
we note the definition relied upon by 
the State of Nevada in State v. Watts, 
296 Pac. 26, (1931) as follows: 
"'In a statute providing that 
one who aids, abets, or pro-
cures another to commit a 
crime may be prosecuted the 
same as the principal, the 
word "aid" means to help, 
assist, or strengthen; the 
word "abet" to encourage, 
counsel, induce, or assist, 
and the word"procure" means to 
persuade, induce, prevail 
upon or cause.' 16 C. J. 
130; State v. Snell, 5 Ohio 
Dec 670, 2 Ohio N. P 55." 
(17) 
To induce or procure requires an 
affirmative act to bring about a cer-
tain result. The only witness for the 
state (Mr. Williams) who could give 
any testimony about procuring or in-
ducing, denied that Mr. McGee induced 
or procured him to commit that act. 
Based on the testimony of Mr. 
Williams, the court erred in refusing 
to grant appellant's Motion to Dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the law and the facts, this 
case should be remanded to the District 
Court for dismissal or in the alter-
native for a new trial. 
Respectfully Submitted 
H. DON SHARP 
Attorney at Law 
523 Eccles Building 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
(18) 
